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PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
AN ESSAY IN OXYMORON
ELLEN WERTHEIMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
( ourts have frequently awarded punitive damages in strict prod-
ucts liability/design defect cases.' This Article argues that such
awards are not consistent with the goals of strict products liability or
with the principles of fairness that strict products liability doctrine
is designed to serve. 2 Quite simply, there can be no punitive dam-
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law, B.A. 1975, J.D., 1979,
Yale University. I wish to thank Barbara Shander, my research assistant, for her
energetic and excellent work on this article.
1. See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 839 (3d Cir. 1983) (de-
fective motorcycle case stating that punitive damages may be awarded for "outra-
geous conduct"); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that punitive damages could be awarded against automobile manufac-
turer found to have been wanton or reckless), modified, 670 F.2d 21 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46-47 (Alaska
1979) (allowing punitive damages where defendant gun manufacturer knew of re-
volver's defective design and that injury and deaths would result from defect, but
nonetheless continued to market product), modified, 615 P.2d 204 (Alaska 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, 418 (1967) (affirming award of punitive damages in case involving MER/29, a
high cholesterol drug); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984)
(holding that punitive damages could be awarded in case involving Dalkon Shield
IUD (intrauterine device)); Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware Co., 602 P.2d 1326,
1331 (Kan. 1979) (permitting punitive damages against defendant manufacturer
of aluminum stepladder on showing of reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights);
Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 739 (Minn.) (holding that evi-
dence of wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights warranted award of punitive dam-
ages against defendant manufacturer of children's cotton flannelette nightgown),
cert. denied sub nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Rinker v.
Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (stating, in case regard-
ing defective automobile carburetor, that "there is no fundamental reason for ex-
cluding products liability cases from the cases in which punitive damages may be
recovered"); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 444 (Wis. 1980) (stating,
in case regarding defective automobile fuel tank, that "[a]warding punitive dam-
ages in a product liability case is a natural, direct outgrowth of basic common law
concepts of tort law and punitive damages"); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms,
Inc., 293 N.W.2d 897, 906 (Wis. 1980) (holding that defendant manufacturer of
defective baseball pitching machine was liable for punitive damages where defend-
ant had actual knowledge of defect).
2. Some courts and commentators believe that punitive damages and strict
products liability are theoretically incompatible. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908(2) (1977) (stating that "[iun assessing punitive damages, the trier of
fact can properly consider the character of defendant's act .. "). Contra David G.
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 1257, 1268-
71 (1976) (concluding that theoretical incompatibility argument is erroneous)
(505)
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ages without fault. Thus, if a plaintiff can make a case for the impo-
sition of punitive damages, that plaintiff will be able to prove that
the defendant was at fault, and should have no need to invoke strict
products liability. Conversely, if a plaintiff would lose in the ab-
sence of strict products liability doctrine, that plaintiff, by defini-
tion, will be unable to make a case for the imposition of punitive
damages on the particular defendant, because that plaintiff will be
unable to prove fault.
This Article focuses on the relationship between design de-
fectS3 and punitive damages because of the potential for widespread
liability that a design defect creates. 4 This potential means that
[hereinafter Owen, Punitive Damages]; Richard D. Schuster, Comment, Punitive
Damages Awards in Strict Products Liability Litigation: The Doctrine, the Debate, the De-
fenses, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 771, 781-82 (1981) (concluding that there is no basis for
incompatibility argument). Compare Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (1967) (affirming
award of punitive damages in strict products liability action) with Donald M. Has-
kell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Damages-The Insur-
ance Policy and the Public Policy, 40J. AIR. L. & CoM. 595, 620 (1974) (stating that
"[w]hen a plaintiff relies on a strict liability theory, logic compels the conclusion
that punitive damages are inappropriate") and Forrest L. Tozer, Punitive Damages
and Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNS. J. 300, 301 (1972) ("Strict liability and puni-
tive damages will not mix. In strict liability the character of the defendants' act is
of no consequence; in the punitive damages claim the character of the act is
paramount.").
3. The argument has been recently made that the section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts was primarily designed to apply to manufacturing defects.
SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Essay: Will a New Restatement Help
Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1260 (1993) (stating that
drafters of section 402A did not foresee products liability actions based on design
defects and failures to warn). It is difficult to see how this argument could be
correct. Section 402A was in large part based upon Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, the parent of strict liability, which was itself a design defect case. See Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1963) (establishing strict
liability in tort of manufacturer of defective woodworking machine). Nor does the
language of section 402A lend itself to such a narrow reading. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i & k (1964) (listing products such as sugar, whis-
key, tobacco and rabies vaccine because of their essential nature, not because of
the risk that they will embody a manufacturing defect).
4. In a design defect case, the plaintiff argues that all of the units in the prod-
uct line share an identical defect. Design defects thus threaten equally all those
who come into contact with the particular product, and therefore bring with them
the potential for widespread injury and liability. Failure to warn cases resemble
design defect cases, even in those jurisdictions that do not treat the failure to warn
as a design defect, because the failure to warn applies to all of the products in the
particular line.
The potential for widespread design defect liability is demonstrated by the
facts that the number of claims filed in actions involving the Dalkon Shield IUD
and Agent Orange has exceeded 250,000, and that the number of asbestos claims
is rapidly approaching-if it has not already exceeded-this number. THE AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 385-86 (1991) [hereinafter ALl REPORTERS' STUDY]. Further, approxi-
mately 1,500 suits were filed by plaintiffs who suffered injuries as a result of their
use of the drug MER/29, and hundreds of more claims were settled before a com-
[Vol. 39: p. 505
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courts should be especially cautious before awarding punitive dam-
ages in design defect cases. 5 Because a design defect affects all of
the product units equally, a single design defect may have an im-
pact upon a large group of persons. The primary focus of tort dam-
ages should lie with their compensatory function. Because the
ability of subsequent plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages
may depend on the manufacturer remaining solvent, punitive dam-
ages are a luxury that courts should avoid awarding in order to pro-
tect the broader-based right of all claimants to compensatory
payment.6 Thus, plaintiffs as a group should oppose the awarding
of punitive damages in strict products liability cases.
A further reason exists for plaintiffs to oppose the award of
punitive damages in strict products liability cases. The introduction
of fault concepts via punitive damages doctrine lends credence to,
and may even encourage, those who would argue-largely for the
defense-that liability for design defects should not attach in the
plaint was ever filed. Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Success-
ful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116, 121 (1968) (contending that civil
litigation protects public policy concerns of regulating pharmaceutical industry
where "FDA, Congress, the medical profession and the industry itself" fail to do
so). In addition, over 1,000 claims have been filed by persons alleging injuries
resulting from the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES). ALl REPORTERS' STUDY, at 385-86.
In Moseley v. General Motors Corp., a Georgia state court recently awarded compensa-
tory damages of $4.24 million and punitive damages of $101 million in a products
liability case that involved the design of a General Motors pickup truck. The
number of additional lawsuits that could follow this substantial award is limited
only by the fact that a mere 4.7 million trucks containing the allegedly defective
design Were sold between 1973 and 1987. Brian Gruley, GM Plays a High-Stakes
Game of Recall Roulette, DETROIT FREE PRESs, Apr. 10, 1993, at 3.
5. Suits based on design defects are not, of course, the only type of strict prod-
ucts liability lawsuit. Other types include manufacture and failure to warn-if the
jurisdiction does not treat failure to warn as a design defect. In a mismanufacture
case, the plaintiff argues that the particular product unit was a "lemon" different
from the other units on the assembly line, and does not attack the entire product
line. Punitive damages are less of a practical problem in this context, because the
whole product line is not at risk. Perhaps the classic mismanufacture case is Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno. 150 P.2d 436, 439-40 (Cal. 1944) (holding bot-
tling company strictly liable for damages caused by explosion of defective Coke
bottle). The argument in Escola was that there was something wrong with that
particular bottle, and not a problem with Coke bottles generally. Id.
6. There is some disagreement as to whether there is a punitive damages "cri-
sis." Compare Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42
AM. U. L. REv. 1335, 1363 (1993) (concluding that no crisis exists) with Victor E.
Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and
Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42
AM. U. L. REv. 1365, 1385 (1993) (concluding that trend is towards punitive dam-
ages "run wild"). For the purposes of this Article, it is irrelevant whether there is a
crisis. This Article argues that punitive damages should not be part of any stuict
products liability case, and does not rely exclusively, or even primarily, upon the
havoc-or lack thereof---caused by their availability.
1994]
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absence of fault. Strict products liability doctrine, designed to en-
sure that plaintiffs have an opportunity for compensation in the ab-
sence of fault, is under siege in the name of fault-based liability.7
Any argument against punitive damages that depends upon the
fault-free nature of strict products liability loses its force to the ex-
tent that negligence becomes part of the basis of recovery. Trans-
forming strict products liability into a negligence doctrine opens
the floodgates to fault concepts generally, including those attached
to punitive damages doctrine. Those who would transform strict
products liability into negligence-based liability create the basis for
allowing punitive damages to play an increased role. If fault re-
places strict products liability, there is no reason to foreclose plain-
tiffs from seeking punitive damages.
Punitive damages are fault-based. For those who would keep
all fault out of strict products liability and allow it to remain strict,
the presence of any fault concepts would be anathema.
II. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILrrY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR
DESIGN DEFECTS: THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRADICTION
As their name suggests, punitive damages are designed to pun-
ish certain forms of conduct, such as gross disregard for human
life. 8 Broadly speaking, an award of punitive damages is intended
7. See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negli-
gence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 643, 649
(1980) (rejecting no-fault liability in favor of "reasonableness" standard); David G.
Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REv. 703, 704 (1992) (stating that "[i]n hindsight,
the law's infatuation ... with a rule of strict liability, in opposition to a rule of fault
or, negligence, is now beginning to take on an air of quaintness, reflecting the
exuberant excesses of youth").
8. "An enterprise should be liable for punitive damages only when there is
clear and convincing evidence of reckless disregard for the safety of others in the
decisions made by management officials or other senior personnel." ALI REPORT-
ERS' STUDY, supra note 4, at 264. Many courts and commentators have discussed
the purposes of punitive damages. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 104
n.1 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that punitive damages are intended to "reward" plain-
tiff in rare cases where defendant's actions amount to willful misconduct), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska
1979) (arguing that punitive damages are designed not only to punish wrongdoer,
but also to deter him or her and others from similar wrongdoing in future), modi-
fied, 615 P.2d 204 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); LINDA L. SCHLUE-
TER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2, at 24-31 (2d ed. 1989)
(contending that in most United States jurisdictions, purpose of punitive damages
is nonremunerative); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Pu-
nitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 4-7 (1985-86) (stating that
purposes of punitive damages include punishment, preservation of public order,
additional compensation and deterrence); Thomas C. Galligan, Augmented Awards:
The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3, 7-9 (1990) (arguing that
new role of punitive damages is to deter); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing
[Vol. 39: p. 505
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to convey to the particular defendant, and to all similar defendants
who might commit similar sins, that society will not tolerate what
the particular defendant has done. In order to recover punitive
damages, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has not only
been at fault, but at grievous fault.9 This fact, in itself, proves that
strict liability-liability without fault-and punitive damages simply
do not mix.
The premise of strict products liability, in sharp contrast to that
of punitive damages, is that there are cases in which a manufacturer
of a product should be held liable, even though that manufacturer
has not been at fault.10 This premise is completely inconsistent
with the premise of punitive damages, which is that the manufac-
turer should be punished when that manufacturer has been egre-
giously at fault.
Strict products liability is not wholly, or even primarily, an eco-
nomic doctrine; at its core is an idea of fairness. The fairness con-
cept of strict products liability lies in its role in ensuring that
manufacturers pay for the injuries that their products cause."1 This
Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 7-10
(1982) (considering punitive damages essential to punish defendant and deter de-
fendant and others from similar misbehavior); Schuster, supra note 2, at 772-76
(noting that historically, punitive damages have been used to compensate, punish
and deter wrongdoers).
9. In order to collect punitive damages, most courts require a plaintiff to es-
tablish that the defendant's conduct was willful, wanton, malicious, conscious or in
reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Mo-
tor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 658 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Florida law which requires "wan-
tonness or reckless indifference to the rights of others"), modified, 670 F.2d 21 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp.
608, 610 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (stating necessity of "showing of tortious conduct at-
tended with malice or wanton or reckless disregard of personal rights allows the
assessment of punitive damages"); Day, 594 P.2d at 46 (instructing jury of need for
defendant's "reckless indifference toward the safety of [others or] . . . acts ...
maliciously or wantonly done"); Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 172 Cal. Rptr.
59, 63 (1981) (stating punitive damages only available for conscious disregard of
safety of others); Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 427 N.E.2d 608, 617 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) (mandating "flagrant indifference to the public safety" (quoting David G.
Owens, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257
(1976))); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(requiring defendant's "complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the
safety of others for liability"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2)
(1977) (stating that "[p]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outra-
geous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others").
10. Liability results even where "the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A(2)(a) (1964).
11. Comment c to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts out-
lines many of the purposes of the strict liability doctrine and states:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said
1994]
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fairness depends not upon fault, but upon responsibility.1 2 In a
true strict liability case, neither party is at fault. In a negligence
action, on the other hand, holding one party liable is a relatively
straightforward proposition, because liability follows fault. The de-
fendant is simply being made to pay for the impact of its blamewor-
thy action on the plaintiff. This is morally satisfying, as the person
paying the damages is a wrongdoer who failed to take adequate
care to avoid injury to those using its products. In a case meriting
the award of punitive damages, the moral nature of recovery be-
comes even more apparent than in negligence, as the paying de-
fendant was not only negligent, but also evil.
In true strict liability cases, however, fault is not at issue. In the
absence of wrongdoing, a different rationale is needed to justify
placing liability on the manufacturer. The question becomes one
of deciding which of two faultless parties should bear the cost of the
injury. Those who are wedded to fault concepts find themselves in
an unbearable dilemma in answering this question, and thus in the
absence of fault have a tendency to let the loss stay where it is-on
the plaintiff.13
to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption,
has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member
of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the
right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for
which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand
behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of acci-
dental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer
of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c; see Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573
P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (stating that "[o] ne of the principal purposes behind the
strict product liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of the onerous evi-
dentiary burdens" of establishing a negligence case); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (stating that "[ t ] he purpose of [strict] liabil-
ity is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers that put such products on the markets rather than by the
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves"); W. Page Keeton, Prod-
uct Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 35 (1973) (observing that
"[a] fourth and perhaps the major reason ordinarily given for strict liability in this
area is that those engaged in the manufacturing enterprise can serve effectively as
risk distributors by accepting responsibility for accident losses attributable to the
dangerousness of products as a cost of doing business").
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (stating that "the justi-
fication for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his
product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsi-
bility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it").
13. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 7, at 717-18 (discussing strict liability and stating
6
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There is, however, another way of looking at this fault-free di-
lemma, as a matter of responsibility. The manufacturer has put the
product on the market, is responsible for its presence in the plain-
tiff's hands, and has profited from its availability. Thus, even in the
complete absence of fault, a strong fairness argument supports the
conclusion that the loss should fall on the party who is responsible
for the product, the manufacturer.1 4 The injuries a defective prod-
uct causes are part of the true cost of that product.15 Further, a
manufacturer who profits from a product without paying for the
injuries caused receives a windfall because the accident costs of that
product become part of its profit.16
This argument survives analysis even in the most faultless con-
text, that of unknowable dangers. Arguably, if a danger is unknow-
able, the manufacturer has not been able to: (1) price its product
to reflect a known risk or spread the cost in a forward-looking man-
ner, (2) insure against that risk and (3) avoid that risk. 17 That man-
ufacturer is nonetheless responsible for the presence of the
product on the market. Leaving the loss on the plaintiff essentially
does to the plaintiff what those who oppose true fault-free liability
refuse to do to the defendant: it makes the plaintiff pay the costs of
the defective product. Because the defendant is, at least, responsi-
ble for the presence of the product on the market, this result is
more unfair to the plaintiff than placing the cost of the injuries on
that "[i]f the goal of punishment is to vindicate and discourage improper harms,
punishment is plainly inappropriate to when the harm at issue was ... proper").
14. For a contrary view, see David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products
Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 447-53 (1993)
(arguing that "equality" would demand that the injured party be restored by the
defendant, who chose to expose the injured party to the risk).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (stating that "public
policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products ... be
treated as a cost of production").
16. If followed out to its conclusion, this argument leads to the result that a
manufacturer should pay all of the costs generated by its product, whether that
product is defective or not. Such a conclusion is beyond the scope of this Article.
The fact that a product must be found defective before it can be the source of
liability provides protection for the manufacturer who is making a socially useful
product, such as certain vaccines, in which the unavoidable dangers are heavily
outweighed by the social utility. Not all dangerous products are defective; if the
utility of the product outweighs its dangers, that product is not defective and the
manufacturer will not be liable for the injuries it causes. The specter of absolute
liability is just that: a specter. See Ellen Wertheimer, Azzarello Agonistes: Bucking
the Strict Products Liability Tide, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 419, 437-38 (1993) (discussing im-
pact of confusing "danger" and "defect").
17. See generallyJames A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse
in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 273-74
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the defendant is to the defendant. In the case of an unknowable
danger, neither party has been able to avoid or insure against the
particular hazard. Therefore, liability should fall on the manufac-
turer, the party responsible for the product's presence on the
market.
Thus, strict products liability serves the fairness goal by making
the party responsible for the product pay for the damage it causes.
In order to accomplish this goal, strict products liability enables
plaintiffs to prevail without proving negligence or fault of any kind
on the part of defendants.18 Any injection of fault principles into
strict products liability doctrine dilutes its nature and renders it su-
perfluous. A plaintiff who can prove negligence on the part of the
defendant does not need to invoke strict products liability in order
to win because that plaintiff may rely on fault as the basis for liabil-
ity. The only plaintiffs who need to invoke strict products liability
doctrine are those who cannot prove fault on the part of the
defendant.
The existence of the fairness concerns discussed above means
that success at meeting economic goals is only part of the standard
for measuring the success of strict products liability doctrine. 19 As
Dean Calabresi has stated:
Nor would we be surprised if distributional goals will fairly
frequently lead to liability results under a strict liability test
which are pretty clearly wrong if one considers primary
cost avoidance alone.... To say that this is wrong would
be to conclude that once a liability test is chosen the role
of the courts is to give effect only to efficiency .... This
conclusion is not ... a necessary one.20
This passage refutes the argument that strict products liability doc-
18. Strict liability applies even when "the seller has exercised all possible care
in the preparation and sale of his product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A(2)(a) (1964).
19. In comment c to section 402A, the drafters listed four policies behind
strict products liability. Only one of these is economic. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. c. For a further discussion of the policies behind strict prod-
ucts liability, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1084 (1972). Strict products liability law was designed to pro-
mote fairness by requiring that the manufacturer, not the consumer, pay for inju-
ries caused by the product involved. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d
897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (stating that purpose of strict liability "is to ensure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturer
that puts such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves").
[Vol. 39: p. 505
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trine is indefensible as a matter of pure economic theory and
should therefore be abandoned. 21 The fact that economic theory
cannot, by itself, justify strict products liability is not enough to war-
rant abandoning the doctrine unless it was adopted for purely eco-
nomic reasons in the first place, which it demonstrably was not.
By definition, for a plaintiff to prevail in a suit for punitive
damages, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has been
guilty of some form of "outrageous conduct."2 2 Even a defendant
who has been guilty of negligent conduct may not be held liable for
punitive damages, unless the negligence descends to the level of
evil required by the criteria for punitive damages awards. 23 Also by
definition, faultless defendants cannot be held liable for punitive
damages, though they may be held liable for damages in strict
liability. 24
A fortiori, a plaintiff who can prove that the defendant should
be liable for punitive damages has no need for strict products liabil-
ity doctrine in making his or her case. He or she will have ample
evidence that the defendant was not only at fault, but at egregious
fault. Thus, punitive damages have no place in a true strict prod-
ucts liability case. If the plaintiff proves entitlement to punitive
damages, the case is no longer one in strict liability, because in a
strict products liability case, there is nothing to punish. Because
punishment is the sole focus of punitive damages, their availability
in a strict products liability case is a contradiction in terms. The
availability of punitive damages may also detract from the fault-free
nature of strict products liability by shifting the focus from the ab-
sence of fault to its punishment-worthy presence.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND STRICT LIABILITY FOR DESIGN
DEFECTS: THE LEGAL CONTRADICTION
The first section of this Article outlined the reasons why strict
21. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 205
(1973) (arguing that authors preferring use of strict liability to resolve conflicts
over resource use do not properly analyze economic consequences of strict
liability).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977).
23. For examples of the level to which defendant's conduct must sink in or-
der for a court to award punitive damages, see supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
24. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1037-38 (Ore. 1974)
(stating that "[a]n article can have a degree of dangerousness which the law of
strict liability will not tolerate even though the actions of the designer were entirely
reasonable in view of what he knew at the time he planned and sold the manufac-
tured article" (quoting Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (Ore. 1974))).
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products liability and punitive damages are philosophically incon-
sistent. Briefly put, strict products liability is based upon the ab-
sence of fault, and punitive damages require its presence.
However, there are also legal arguments that support the position
that punitive damages have no place in strict products liability
cases. Punitive damages are unique in several ways, all of which are
inconsistent with strict products liability.
A. Size of Award
The amount awarded as punitive damages has no necessary
connection with the damage done;2 5 rather, the award depends on
the size of the defendant and the degree of evil its conduct repre-
sents. 26 Strict products liability doctrine was developed to ensure
that plaintiffs would be compensated for their injuries, a goal that is
exceeded when plaintiffs receive both compensatory and punitive
damages.27
Design defect cases, with their widespread impact, also bring
with them the potential for awards of punitive damages to different
multiple plaintiffs.2 8 The compensatory goal of strict products lia-
bility may be vitiated entirely when repeated punitive damages
25. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2714 (1993) (upholding award of $19,000 compensatory and 10 million punitive
damages, or 526 times amount of compensatory damages, in slander of title ac-
tion); see also Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(awarding $150,000 compensatory and $10 million punitive damages, or approxi-
mately 67 times amount of compensatory damages, in action involving defective
design of fuel system of truck tractor), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd on
reh'g, 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982) (remitting punitive damages to $450,000). For
a general discussion of the history and purpose of punitive damages, see Schwartz
& Behrens, supra note 6, at 1368-70.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (stating that "[i]n assessing
punitive damages .... consider ... the nature and extent of the harm to the
plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause"). The exact proof neces-
sary to support an award of punitive damages varies among states. Most require
gross negligence, willfulness or wantonness. For a discussion of the level of a de-
fendant's evil conduct necessary to award punitive damages, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
27. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). Green-
man itself states that "[t ] he purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless
to protect themselves." Id. Punitive damages are not part of the costs of the
injuries.
28. Many defendants have argued that multiple or excessive punitive damage
awards violate their constitutional right to due process of law. See e.g., TXO, 113 S.
Ct. at 2720 (plurality upholding award of punitive damages 526 times greater than
amount of compensatory damages and noting that there is no bright line or math-
ematical test for determining whether punitive damage award violates due pro-
cess); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18-24 (1991) (outlining three-
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awards render a defendant unable to pay compensatory damages to
future plaintiffs. 29
One of the goals of strict products liability is cost-spreading.
This goal is defeated by the award of punitive damages. In a case
where the dangers of the product are known, the manufacturer
prices the product accordingly, setting up what amounts to an in-
surance fund to pay for injuries caused by the product. Because
punitive damages awards are so large and so unpredictable, it is
impossible for the manufacturer to take such awards into account
when pricing its product. Thus, to the extent that strict products
liability is intended to serve cost-spreading, punitive damages have
no place in the doctrine because they completely defeat this goal.
Further, as was discussed above, cost-spreading may be impossi-
ble in cases where the danger is unknowable.30 Strict products lia-
bility has more than one goal, however. Where the danger is
knowable, the twin goals of fairness and cost-spreading trump any
societal justification for the award of punitive damages. Where the
danger is unknowable, the fairness rationale takes center stage and
overcomes the absence of cost-spreading to justify strict products
liability.
B. Recipient of Award
The identity of the particular plaintiff who receives a punitive
step test to be used in determining whether punitive damage award violates de-
fendant's right to due process of law).
More recently, in Dunn v. HOVIC, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the imposition of multiple punitive damage awards does
not, by itself, violate due process. 1 F.3d 1371, 1387 (3d Cir.), modified in part, 1
F.3d 58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 114
S. Ct. 650 (1993). Rather, it is one factor to consider in assessing punitive dam-
ages. Id. The asbestos defendant, Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation, sought
to have the $25 million punitive damage award stricken. Id. at 1382-83. In support
of its position, the defendant argued that multiple punitive damage awards stem-
ming from the same asbestos products violated its right to due process. Id. at 1385.
The court found merit in this argument. Id. at 1391. However, it did not find
that the particular defendant in this case established any due process violation. Id.
The court stated: "[Owens-Corning] simply has not made a 'showing that the total
[amount of punitive damages assessed so far] is even close to whatever limit due
process might impose on the total punitive damages that may be assessed ... for
... misconduct with respect to asbestos warnings.'" Id. at 1390 (quoting Simpson
v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S.
1057 (1990)).
29. This is, of course, a particularly strong concern in design defect cases,
because future plaintiffs are inevitable. For a discussion of the widespread liability
inherent in design defect cases, see supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the difficulty of cost-spreading in cases where the dan-
ger of a product is unknowable, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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damages award is largely a matter of chance. In the context of de-
sign defects, a plaintiff prevails by showing that the particular de-
fendant has been guilty of evil conduct in the course of designing
its product. Since design defect cases focus, on an aspect of the
product that affects all of those who are exposed to it, the evil con-
duct at issue exists not with respect to any particular person, but
rather with respect to that class of persons who have been or will be
exposed to the product.31 The fact that a particular plaintiff proves
an entitlement to punitive damages has little to do with the particu-
lar plaintiff, and everything to do with the conduct of the defend-
ant towards a much larger group of people. Thus, there is no
compelling reason why a particular plaintiff should receive the pu-
nitive damages award, any more than any other plaintiff who has
been injured by the product. Indeed, the class of persons entitled
to punitive damages should arguably include more than just those
actually injured by the product. Punitive damages are awarded
against defendants who have created a risk, and the class of those
affected includes all those exposed to the risk by use of the product,
and not just those injured thereby.32
31. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383-84 (Ct. App.
1981) (noting tha t potential liability existed for punitive damages awards in other
cases for identical design defect in Ford Pinto's fuel system which had resulted in
punitive damage award of $125 million, remitted to $3.5 million on appeal). In a
recent examination of products liability actions, the American Law Institute
(A.L.I.) expressed concern over the possibility of unlimited punitive damage
awards in similar design defect cases:
If a defectively designed product is unduly hazardous, it may injure hun-
dreds or even thousands of purchasers and users. If liability for punitive
damages can be established for any of the resulting tort claims, then such
an award should be available for all the claims arising out of the [same]
corporate misdeed.
ALl REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 4, at 260 (emphasis added).
32. Some jurisdictions have resolved this problem by enacting statutes that
declare that plaintiffs will not, in fact, receive all, or sometimes any, of the punitive
damages award themselves. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987) (one-
third of all reasonable exemplary damages collected in civil actions are to be paid
into state General Fund; although this statute was found to be unconstitutional in
Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991), to date it has not been
repealed); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1993) (in civil actions
based on personal injury or wrongful death, 35% of punitive damages are to be
paid to Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund; in all other civil actions, 35% of
punitive damages are to be paid to General Revenue Fund); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-
12-5.1(e) (2) (Supp. 1993) (75% of any punitive damage award, after payment of
attorneys' fees and costs, is to be paid into state treasury through Fiscal Division of
Department of Administrative Services; although this statute was found to be un-
constitutional in McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga.
1990), to date it has not been repealed); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 para. 2-1207
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (trial court has discretion to determine how much, if
any, of punitive damage award is to be paid to Illinois Department of Rehabilita-
tion Services); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1.2 (West 1987) (if defendant's conduct is
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Nor is there any reason why one particular plaintiff should re-
ceive an award of punitive damages rather than others who have
suffered or will suffer the same injury. The defendant may have
made a reprehensible design decision. If so, it was equally repre-
hensible with respect to all of those adversely affected by the prod-
uct. Because no company will be able to pay punitive damages
indefinitely, awarding punitive damages only to those who simply
ask first allows the legal system to fall victim to inertia33 and to the
kindergarten rationale of first come, first served.3 4 Moreover, as
was discussed above, awarding punitive damages to first comers may
deprive those who have not yet been injured of compensatory dam-
ages. 35 A compensated plaintiff who receives an award of punitive
damages in no sense "deserves" it. Such a plaintiff has been fully
compensated, and receives the punitive damages award solely by
reason of the defendant's conduct, not by reason of anything that
has happened to him or her as an individual.
Indeed, the design defect context presents the strongest argu-
ment against awarding punitive damages, simply because of the po-
tential for enormous numbers of plaintiffs such a defect may
generate. The award of punitive damages may prevent strict prod-
ucts liability from serving its cost-spreading and compensatory goals
by bankrupting the defendant company before it has had the op-
portunity to compensate all of those injured by the product.
directed specifically at plaintiff, then full amount of punitive damages is payable to
plaintiff; otherwise, at least 75% of punitive damage award is to be paid into civil
reparations trust fund; award may be reduced by up to 25% for payment of costs
and fees); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1992) (50% of punitive damages is
to be paid to State's Health Care Stabilization Fund); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675
(Vernon 1988) (50% of any punitive damage award, after payment of attorneys'
fees and expenses, is to be paid to state's Tort Victims' Compensation Fund); OR.
REV. STAT. § 18.540 (Supp. 1992) (50% of all punitive damage awards, after pay-
ment of attorneys' fees, is to be paid to Criminal Injuries Compensation Account);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (50% of punitive damages in excess of
$20,000, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs,, is to be paid to state's General
Fund).
33. Inertia in this situation is represented by the position that punitive dam-
ages have always been done this way. This article takes the position that the legal
system must continually justify how it operates. If the award of punitive damages to
first comers makes no sense in the design defect context, then the policy should be
changed.
34. The idea of "first come, first served" until all assets are depleted seems
inappropriate in the context of punitive damages awards, where conduct has been
equally culpable towards all of those who are affected by the product. Cf ALI
REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 4, at 260 (stating that all punitive damage claims
stemming from one corporate misfeasance should be honored, if one plaintiff can
establish corporate liability for act).
35. For a discussion of the effect of punitive damage awards on future plain-
tiffs, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
1994]
13
Wertheimer: Punitive Damages and Strict Products Liability: An Essay in Oxymo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
C. Assessment of Award
Punitive damages are based on the value of the defendant com-
pany.3 6 This concept is sound if one is dealing with an issue involv-
ing only a single lawsuit.3 7 If one is dealing with a design defect,
which has the potential to reach large numbers of people, however,
a new problem emerges.3 8 At some point, the defendant company
will run out of assets, and not all of those injured by the product
will be able to collect compensatory, let alone punitive, damages.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in deter-
mining whether punitive damages were appropriate in an asbestos
case, expressed concern over the possibility that future plaintiffs
might be unable to collect even compensatory damages:
The grave reality of the need to maintain viable enter-
36. The defendant's size and wealth is a factor to be considered by the jury in
their determination of punitive damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908(2) (1977) (stating that "[i]n assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can
properly consider ... the wealth of the defendant"). The rationale behind this is
"that it takes more to punish a rich [person] than a poor one." Owen, supra note
8, at 9.
Many juries believe the theory that a larger award is necessary for wealthier
companies, in order for them to feel the sting of the punishment. See id. at 20
(discussing jury's rationale in assessing large punitive damage award against multi-
million dollar company). For example, in 1976, Ford Motor Company had a net
worth of $7.7 billion and after-tax income of $983 million. Grimshaw v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388-89 (Ct. App. 1981) (action involving defective fuel
tank of Ford Pinto automobile). The jury in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. awarded
punitive damages of $125 million. Id. at 389. In doing so, the jurors believed that
such a large award was necessary to "teach a meaningful lesson to a company 'mak-
ing' millions of dollars every day." Owen, supra note 8, at 46. More recently, in
Dunn v. HOVIC, plaintiff's counsel told the jury to "have courage to tell [the de-
fendant] multi-national company that it's not going to . . . hurt people and lie
about it." 1 F.3d 1371, 1376 n.4 (3d Cir.), modified in part, 1 F.3d 58 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). By
doing so, the attorney hoped to recover a larger punitive damage award, based on
the size of the defendant. Id. Although the punitive damage award was remitted
to $1 million on appeal, the jury awarded the plaintiff $25 million in punitive dam-
ages. Id. at 1391. In addition, the Dunn court, in upholding the punitive damage
award, alluded to the great wealth of the defendant, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Cor-
poration, whose net earnings average almost $200 million. Id. at 1383.
37. An example of such conduct might be gross negligence with respect to a
medical malpractice suit. See Cash v. Kim, 342 S.E.2d 61 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (up-
holding punitive damages award in medical malpractice case where defendants
were found to have been grossly negligent).
38. A products liability action has the potential to generate hundreds or
thousands of punitive damage claims. "In a products liability context [the pros-
pect] of punitive damages is particularly disturbing to the manufacturer who dis-
tributes his product to thousands, and sometimes millions of users." 3 L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LLAmurrY § 33.01(7), at 302 (1978). For a list of prod-
ucts resulting in numerous punitive damage awards, see supra note 1 and accompa-
nying text; see also Alan Schulkin, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1797, 1797-1800 (1979).
518 [Vol. 39: p. 505
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss2/7
OXYMORON
prises to meet future compensation liabilities ...com-
mands consideration of the whole picture. . . . If the
enterprise should fail, early victims would receive compen-
sation but others whose latency periods were longer would
receive no compensation at all. At the point where awards
of punitive damages destroy the viability of the enterprises
necessary to accomplish loss distribution, the remedy of
punitive damages becomes incompatible with the strict lia-
bility cause of action. The later victims, not the enterprise,
effectively bear the punishment. 39
It is obvious that all plaintiffs cannot each receive a separate award
of punitive damages. The first few might receive such an award, but
at some point the assets of the defendant would become so de-
pleted that the plaintiffs would be unable to recover compensatory
damages, let alone punitive damages.40 Eventually, after repeated
punitive damages awards, the evidence of declining corporate
worth provided to the jury might itself protect the defendant from
further punitive damages verdicts. 41 However, this would not occur
until there has been significant asset depletion, compromising the
ability of the corporation to compensate future plaintiffs.
Thus, not only do punitive damages make little sense in the
context of strict products liability, there are affirmative reasons why
39. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 524-26 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). The court in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp. refused to award punitive damages in this asbestos case because of its con-
cern for the "continued viability of the strict liability cause of action for present
and future claimants." Id. at 530.
40. Judge Friendly expressed concern over the problem of multiple punitive
damages awards when he stated that "[w] e have the gravest difficulty in perceiving
how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the
nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill." Roginsky v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
Most courts, however, have refused to strike down an award of punitive dam-
ages simply because of the problem of "overkill." See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 402-07 (5th Cir.) (refusing to rule as matter of
law that punitive damages should not be awarded in mass tort cases), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357, 376-77
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that punitive damages are recoverable so long as conduct
exhibited with respect to individual plaintiff can be termed outrageous), aff'd sub
nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985).
41. In considering whether to assess multiple punitive damages against a sin-
gle defendant, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. noted that
"a jury might decide that a defendant's financial position, as a result of other
awards of punitive damages for the same conduct, is so precarious that a sizeable
award of punitive damages would be inappropriate." Acosta v. Honda Motor Co.,
717 F.2d 828, 839 n.17 (3d Cir. 1983).
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punitive damages and strict products liability/design defect litiga-
tion simply should not be found in the same case.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILrrY: THE
PRACTICAL CONTRADICTION
This Article has already demonstrated that punitive damages
and strict products liability share no common ground as a matter of
legal philosophy or theory. The barriers to combining the two,
however, go beyond the metaphysical. It is clear that defendants
oppose this combination. This part of the Article will demonstrate
that plaintiffs as a group should oppose it as well. Two arguments
support this position. First, the availability of punitive damages may
vitiate the compensatory function of strict products liability. Sec-
ond, using fault concepts in the award of punitive damages under-
cuts strict products liability theory as a whole.
A. Vitiation of the Compensation Function of Strict Products Liability
Design defects have the potential to injure multiple persons. 42
The desire to compensate those injured by such defects constitutes
perhaps the main reason why strict products liability was developed
and adopted. 43 This goal may be defeated by the imposition of pu-
nitive damages, however.
The imposition of punitive damages can vitiate the goal of
compensating injured persons in several ways. First, punitive dam-
ages can interfere with the ability of the defendant to pay compen-
satory damages in the future. 44 . When one is dealing with a design
42. For examples of multiple claims arising out of a single design defect, see
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
43. The American Law Institute has characterized compensatory damages as a
"fundamental tort right." ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 4, at 260-61.
44. In Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., the court refused to award punitive
damages. 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). The
court's primary reason was its concern for the continued financial viability of the
defendant, which was necessary to insure compensation for future asbestosis claim-
ants. James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1143-44 (1984) (arguing that "purpose
of the punitive damages doctrine has never been and never shall be the economic
destruction of business entities").
Some courts have failed to sufficiently consider this when awarding punitive
damages. For example, in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., the court affirmed an award of
punitive damages and concluded that "the loss of investment and the decline in
value of investments are risks which investors knowingly undertake." 294 N.W.2d
437, 453-54 (Wis. 1980). However, the Wangen court supported its holding only
with respect to the loss to owners and stockholders. Id. The court failed to con-
sider future plaintiffs, who could collect neither compensatory nor punitive dam-
ages from a bankrupt company.
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defect, inevitably some of the injuries lie in the future.45 The ability
of those future plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages depends
upon the particular defendant remaining a solvent corporation. 46
If awarding punitive damages interferes with the ability of the cor-
poration to remain solvent, then these future plaintiffs will be de-
prived of any recovery. As a group, plaintiffs are ill-served by
weakening the defendant to such an extent that its ability to pay
compensatory damages may become nonexistent.
A design defect may on occasion be so serious or so pervasive
that the manufacturer is driven out of business in the process of
.paying compensatory damages.47 However, if liability is restricted
to compensatory damages only, far more plaintiffs will receive pay-
ment than would have been the case had punitive damages been
allowed. Indeed, a financially shaky defendant may necessitate judi-
cial creativity. For example, a defendant might set up a fund so that
some fairness in the distribution process may be maintained. In
The Third Circuit recently expressed concern over the need for a defendant
to remain viable in Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir.), modified in part, 1 F.3d
58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Owens-Corning Fiberglas v. Dunn, 114 S. Ct. 650
(1993). The Dunn court upheld an award of punitive damages against defendant,
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, although the award was remitted to $1 mil-
lion. Id. at 1391. In its decision to uphold the award, the court specifically re-
ferred to the wealth of the defendant. See id. at 1390 (noting that defendant had
$1.26 billion in unexhausted products liability insurance coverage). The wealth of
the defendant and its ability to pay other damage claims were factors to be used in
determining the appropriateness of a punitive damage award. Id. at 1391. In up-
holding the punitive damage award in this case, the Dunn court noted that the
defendant failed to show "that it will not be able to pay future awards of either
compensatory or punitive damages." Id. at 1390.
45, See United States v. General Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(predicting future injuries from faulty carburetors).'
46. This problem is particularly apparent in asbestos cases. For example,
Johns-Manville Corporation filed for Chapter 11 reorganization on August 26,
1982. John P. Burns, et al., Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, & Polit-
ical Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 573, 691 n.716 (Charles D.
Maguire,Jr. ed. 1983). During 1981 and the first half of 1982, 10 punitive damage
verdicts averaging $616,000 each had already been assessed against Johns-Manville.
In addition, Unanco and Amatex Corporation filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Id. at 807-08. Each company stated that
litigation expenses, as well as compensatory and punitive damages relating to as-
bestos cases were the primary reasons for its bankruptcy. Id. at 808.
47. Indeed, the prospect of paying compensatory damages to large numbers
of people may in itself drive a corporation into bankruptcy. Some of the same
arguments as set forth above with respect to punitive damages may be used to
justify a class action system for compensating those injured by a product, if enough
people have been seriously injured so as to threaten the corporation's financial
existence. Of course, care will need to be taken to ensure that corporations do not
use the threat of bankruptcy to justify paying less than the corporation is capable
of paying in damages.
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such a situation, punitive damages are a luxury that the plaintiffs,
considered as a group, can ill afford.
Second, punitive damages also constitute a windfall to a partic-
ular plaintiff. Plaintiffs as a group, however, should have their pri-
orities focused on the need to compensate. Punishment is, in a
sense, a luxury that is not affordable unless and until injured per-
sons have been compensated. Nor is punishment necessary. It is
unlikely that the omission of punitive damages in strict products
liability cases will encourage corporations to be evil. If the corpora-
tion is evil, the case should not be sounding in strict products liabil-
ity, and punitive damages may be awarded. Moreover, if a design
defect is sufficiently egregious, it is likely that a large. pool of plain-
tiffs will eventually demand compensatory damages, even if punitive
damages are not available. 48 This in itself will serve as a disincentive
for any evil corporate conduct in allowing a grossly defective prod-
uct onto the market. To bring the argument full circle: If the de-
fendant has engaged in truly evil conduct such that punitive
damages are warranted, the plaintiff will have no need to use strict
products liability in making his or her case, and the question of
mixing the two theories should not arise.
B. Aiding and Abetting the Attack on Strict Liability
In the years since its inception, strict products liability has be-
come riddled with fault concepts to such an extent that its very
existence as a basis for recovery has been threatened, if not de-
stroyed.49 The defense side has discharged its ammunition effec-
tively, terrifying courts into replacing strict products liability with
negligence-based liability in the face of a parade of horribles.50 The
availability of punitive damages, while in theory being beneficial to
plaintiffs, injects fault into a doctrine in which fault does not be-
long.5' Both negligence principles and punitive damages disserve
48. For example, according to Sheila Birnbaum, there are 95,000 asbestos
suits currently pending. Sheila L. Birmbaum, Remarks at the Villanova Law Review
Symposium: Punitive Damages Awards in Product Liability Litigation: Strong
Medicine or Poison Pill? (Oct. 30, 1993) (transcript on file with the Villanova Law
Review).
49. See Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products
Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1183 (1992) (recognizing de-
struction of strict products liability through injection of fault concepts).
50. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) (strict prod-
ucts liability threatens development of new and necessary drugs and causes price
increases in and shortages of needed vaccines).
51. As was discussed above, strict products liability does not benefit plaintiffs
as a group, although the individual plaintiff who is lucky enough to collect such
damages will certainly be benefitted. For a complete discussion of the effects of
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strict products liability by transforming it into a fault-based theory.
In order to serve its fairness function, strict products liability should
remain pure and uncontaminated by any fault concepts whatsoever.
In short, punitive damages have no place in strict products liability.
Ironically, defense arguments that liability should be based on
fault, and that strict products liability should be abandoned, pro-
vide support for the availability of punitive damages. Once strict
products liability has been transformed back into a negligence doc-
trine, there is no doctrinal reason to eliminate the possibility of an
award of punitive damages in appropriate cases. On the other
hand, strict products liability precludes such an award as long as it
remains pure and fault-free. If fault is once again to be the basis of
recovery, there is no purity-of-doctrine argument against punitive
damages, as such damages simply represent the consequences of
extreme fault. On the other hand, those arguments that support
keeping strict products liability free of fault also support eliminat-
ing punitive damages as an unacceptable route for the re-entry of
fault concepts into what should be a doctrine free from blame.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' advocates argue against the interest of plaintiffs as a
group when they support the availability of punitive damages in
strict products liability litigation.5 2 Such damages open the door to
fault concepts generally and violate the principles behind the adop-
tion of strict products liability in the first place. On the other hand,
defense advocates who argue that fault-based liability should re-
place liability without fault themselves open the door to punitive
damages. The difference between the fault involved in negligence
and the fault involved in punitive damages is one in degree, not in
kind. Once the barrier against fault concepts has been eliminated,
there can be no doctrinal basis for excluding punitive damages
awards from products liability suits.
punitive damages on plaintiffs, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Nor
does the availability of punitive damages in strict products liability cases help soci-
ety as a whole by deterring evil business practices. If the business practices at issue
are sufficiently evil to trigger liability for punitive damages; the plaintiff will have
no need for strict products liability doctrine in making his or her case. It may be
necessary to protect society by making punitive damages available. What is not
necessary is to make them available in strict products liability cases.
52. Of course, products liability suits may be filed under theories other than
strict products liability. The inconsistency lies in allowing punitive damages in
strict products liability suits, and not in products liability suits generally.
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